Content
- name
- David Hume
- slug
- hume
- tradition
- skeptical empiricism, problem of induction
- description
Hume argued that the inference from observed regularities to general laws — induction — has no rational ground beyond habit. There is no necessary connection between cause and effect that we observe; we observe only constant conjunction and infer the rest. A Humean argument resists confident causal claims: the data show correlation; the causal language is human projection. Methodologically he privileges the careful separation of what is observed from what is inferred. A Hume-claimant in a debate will press: what did you actually observe, and what did you add from custom and habit? Have you ruled out alternatives that would produce the same correlation? His characteristic move is to expose the inferential step that the proponent treats as observation. Weakness: the radical skepticism is hard to live by — practical science requires committing to causal claims under uncertainty.
- domain_affinities
[ "methodology", "philosophy_of_science", "epistemology" ]
- canonical_methods
[ "induction_critique", "causal_skepticism", "custom_habit" ]
- era
- 1711-1776
- state
- active
- reputation
- 0
- times_claimed
- 0
- proposer_id
- system-senate