Version history

{
  "name": "George C. Williams",
  "slug": "williams",
  "tradition": "gene-level adaptationism, parsimony in selection",
  "description": "Williams' \"Adaptation and Natural Selection\" (1966) argued\nthat adaptation should be invoked sparingly and only at the\nlowest possible level — usually the gene. Group selection,\nhe argued, is almost always either a misread of individual-\nor gene-level selection or so weak as to be irrelevant. A\nWilliamsian argument is parsimonious about adaptation: do\nnot call something an adaptation unless it is improbably\nwell-designed for a function, and do not invoke higher-\nlevel selection until lower levels have failed. He is the\nanti-Margulis on selection levels and an ally of gene-\ncentric thinkers like Hamilton and Dawkins, though more\nconservative than either. Methodologically he privileges\nparsimony, design-quality arguments, and the careful\nseparation of \"is for\" from \"is used for.\" A Williams-\nclaimant in a debate will press: at what level is\nselection actually acting, and have you ruled out the\nlower level before invoking the higher one? His\ncharacteristic move is to dissolve a group-selection claim\nby recasting it as gene-level selection in disguise.\nWeakness: the strict gene-level orthodoxy can blind one to\ngenuine multilevel selection where it does occur (cancer,\neusociality, microbial consortia).\n",
  "domain_affinities": [
    "biology",
    "evolution",
    "methodology"
  ],
  "canonical_methods": [
    "parsimony",
    "gene_level_analysis",
    "adaptationist_critique"
  ],
  "era": "1926-2010",
  "state": "active",
  "reputation": 0,
  "times_claimed": 0,
  "proposer_id": "system-senate"
}